DRE voting machines with paper trails

While DRE machines without paper trails are also very common, given the current state of voting technology it would be hard to argue that DREs with paper trails would be less desirable than those with them. While it could be argued whether having a paper audit trail solves all the problems regarding DRE's, provided the resources to audit elections having an audit trail certainly doesn't hurt. Further, having some kind of means to audit DRE machines is key, since otherwise they could change votes and get away with doing so. Therefore it's not important to compare current DREs with current DREs + paper trails - instead, it's more important to compare the best of today's election technology with other proposed systems. This excludes DREs without paper trails.

Infrastructure attack protection
Basic infrastructure is needed for voters to vote using an electronic touch-screen system. The power must be on, and the equipment must work flawlessly.

Outsider hacking protection
It looks very suspicious if a regular civilian is tampering with the voting machine. However it's theoretically possible for someone to break into their polling place and change the firmware - with disastrous effects.

Malware and virus protection
Technically there aren't any viruses, but DREs are often compromised. It is very easy to design malware that changes votes on a DRE. Having a voter verified paper trail helps, but there's no guarantee that it will be used. It's somewhat unclear when votes should tallied using the paper trail as opposed to the electronic record, however.

Man in the middle attack protection
Tampering with the voting machines is possible after votes have been counted, and would not be very difficult. Having a voter verified paper trail helps, but there's no guarantee that it will be used. It's somewhat unclear when votes should tallied using the paper trail as opposed to the electronic record.

Insider attack protection
It would be very easy for an insider to change the firmware of the DRE. Having a voter verified paper trail helps, but there's no guarantee that it will be used.

Coercion resistance
New Yorkers for Verified Voting notes that "Voters...have complained that DRE voting systems do not provide adequate ballot secrecy due to the lack of voting booth curtains coupled with the fact that the DRE voting displays are ... vertical." Engineering a system that fixes this problem isn't hard, but it costs money to replace or modify old DRE machines.

Ensuring one person, one vote
"Many DRE machines'... smart cards might be compromised" so a voter could vote multiple times. A solution may exist, and it looks suspicious if someone spends excessive time at a voting machine, but it's still problematic.

Counting and tallying accuracy
In "single-contest elections, DRE voting systems registered roughly 8 times as many under-votes as" optical scan systems. These might be fixable but there are still a number of counting/recording issues in the status quo that need to be solved.

Voter anonymity
DREs are anonymous because the voting protocol does not ask for any information about the identity of the voter. The voter signs in at a polling place, but there is no way for those signatures to be mapped to the content of individual votes. However, there are concerns about the privacy of many DREs - see the section on coercion for more info.

Voter verifiability
Many voters don't verify their voter verified paper ballot for usability reasons. It's difficult to compare two columns of numbers to verify that no number was missed. Also there might be ink shortages, paper jams, etc. that get in the way of voter verification.

Immediate results protection
Having no intermediate results before the voting period ends is not very significant for a non-absentee voting system. Even if there aren't any practical restrictions to prevent obtaining intermediate results, straw polls in the status quo achieve the same end of producing intermediate results on election day. These are usually accurate,though not so in the 2004 election.

Ease of performing a recount
With the paper trail it's possible to perform a recount in states that recognize the VVPAT as a real ballot. Still, it's cumbersome and may not be done. Also if voters don't verify their ballot then there's no guarantee this will be correct.

Usability
Elderly individuals might find it hard to read and use these touchscreen systems.

Transparency
There is little transparency for DREs besides the fact that many of them have been bought, as the source code was released online.